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Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
2 
 







 James Freeman, pro se, appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment against his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In pertinent part, Freeman’s complaint alleged that Appellees—employees at SCI 
Coal Township, where Freeman was imprisoned—violated his Eighth Amendment rights 
by failing to protect him from the attack of his cell mate and subjecting him to 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.  Freeman originally brought several claims 
under § 1983 and state tort law against over 30 government employees and entities.  In a 
series of dismissal and summary judgment orders, the District Court rejected all but these 
Eighth Amendment claims.  On March 11, 2014, the District Court granted the remaining 
Defendants’1 motion for summary judgment.  Freeman timely appealed.  He argues that 
factual issues implicated in these remaining claims necessitated trial.2 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The remaining named defendants were: Correctional Officers J.A. Miller, Kauffman, J. 
Seedor, McDonald, Hoot, Henz and Fetterolf; Nurses Trautman and Shepperson; 
Sergeants Erdly and Burnhart; Lieutenants Gooler, Shipe, Faust, Burns, Mowrey, and 
Eveland; Captains McCoy and W. Miller; Grievance Coordinator K. K. Dascandi; 
Hearing Examiner Kerns-Barr; Ms. Hamm; Food Manager Shaletsky; Teacher Ms. 
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record “shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  This occurs where a party “fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  In this inquiry, we credit the evidence of the non-movant and 
draw all justifiable inferences in his favor.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).    
 Failure to Protect  
 In late August of 2009, Freeman was placed in restricted housing, where he shared 
a cell with inmate Eric Williams.  According to Freeman, the two did not get along: they 
constantly argued and engaged in physical fights on at least two occasions.  Both men 
requested new, separate cells.  Williams told first- and second-shift correctional 
officers—including Appellees Knorr, J.A. Miller, Kaufman, Erdly, Burnhart, Burns, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Lascavage; and Mail Room Supervisor Jellen.  Also remaining were multiple unnamed 
“John/Jane Doe” defendants.  In its March 11, 2014 order, the District Court dismissed 
Lt. Shipe, Supervisor Jellen, and Nurse Marx as defendants, finding that no claims 
alleging their personal involvement remained or had been brought against them, and 
dismissed all John/Jane Does based on failure to timely identify them. 
 
2 Freeman does not appeal the earlier dismissal and summary judgment orders or take 
issue with the dismissal of Supervisor Jellen, Lt. Shipe, or the John/Jane Does. 
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McDonald, Gooler, Fetterolf, and Mowry—that he would stab Freeman if they did not 
grant that request.  Sgt. Gooler allegedly told Williams that he would be issued a 
disciplinary citation if he did so, but the officers otherwise took no precautions against 
the threat, Freeman stated.   
 On September 6, 2009, Williams attacked Freeman, who appeared to be sleeping, 
with a weapon crafted from a sharpened eyeglass arm.  Standing outside the cell, 
responding Officers Hoot and Henz and Captain McCoy ordered Williams to step away 
from Freeman and throw his weapon out of the cell; when he did so, the officers entered 
the cell and cuffed and removed Williams.  Medical records reflect that Freeman 
sustained no cuts or bruises—the eyeglass shank failed to penetrate his shirt—and had 
only a “questionable” soft spot where he claimed to have head pain.  Freeman argues that 
Appellees unconstitutionally failed to protect him by failing to both adequately respond 
to Williams’ stabbing threat and timely end Williams’ attack. 
 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials “to protect prisoners from 
violence at the hands of other prisoners.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) 
(internal quotation omitted).  Not every prisoner-inflicted injury, however, amounts to a 
constitutional violation.  Id. at 834.  To establish a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner 
must show that: (1) he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 
serious harm” and (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference”—that is, they 
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety.  See id. at 834, 837; see also 
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (noting failure-to-
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protect § 1983 claim also requires showing that the official’s deliberate indifference 
caused the prisoner harm).  Merely negligent conduct is insufficient.  See Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 835.  Prison officials should investigate each incident or threat of violence to 
determine if a request for protective custody is legitimate.  See Young v. Quinlan, 960 
F.2d 351, 363 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992).  An official who knows of a risk to a prisoner can 
avert liability if he shows that he acted reasonably, even if injury still occurred.  Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).   
 Regarding Appellees’ response to Williams’ threat, Freeman has not established a 
genuine factual dispute as to whether Appellees were deliberately indifferent to a 
substantial safety risk.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  Freeman, at 
6’3” and approximately 230 pounds, was much larger than Williams, who was 5’7” and 
140 pounds, and admitted that he would not have said that he was afraid of Williams 
prior to the stabbing incident.  There is no evidence that their alleged prior physical 
altercations resulted in any injury.  In short, there was nothing to suggest that Williams, 
prior to the stabbing incident, posed a “pervasive risk of harm” to Freeman.  See Riley v. 
Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Crediting Freeman’s evidence, Williams directly informed guards of his plans to 
stab Freeman before Williams attacked him.  However, Freeman never requested 
protective custody in response to this threat and admittedly lacked credible fear of an 
attack from Williams.  See Young, 960 F.2d at 363 n.23.  Further, Sgt. Gooler’s threat of 
disciplinary action against Williams if he stabbed Freeman, even if ultimately 
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unsuccessful in preventing the attack, was reasonable under the circumstances.  See 
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 132.  Freeman points to no evidence that the officers were 
aware that Williams had a weapon until he displayed it during the attack.  Moreover, 
Williams’ armed assault while Freeman was allegedly unconscious in fact inflicted little 
to no measurable injury on Freeman.  This underscores the lack of a “substantial risk of 
serious harm” that Williams posed to Freeman.  See Farmer, 511 U.S at 834; Bistrian, 
696 F.3d at 367.  The correctional officers were, at most, negligent in failing to take more 
forceful anticipatory action such as rehousing the inmates based on an unlikely threat.  
See Farmer, 511 U.S at 835.   
 Freeman argues that the District Court ignored an affidavit by Williams declaring 
that his threats received the response, “Go ahead and stab him.”3  Williams’ vague and 
unspecified statements based potentially on hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 801, are not 
sufficiently probative to create a genuine factual issue.  See N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).  Even assuming that 
officers did taunt Williams, there is insufficient evidence showing that his threat appeared 
credible enough that the officers were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to 
                                              
3 Williams claimed that Officer J.A. Miller in particular made that statement, along with 
promising him extra food trays and favorable treatment from the hearing examiner if he 
stabbed Freeman.  However, in a March 4, 2013 order, the District Court dismissed his 
claim against Officer Miller for failure to properly exhaust it through the prison grievance 
process.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The exhaustion requirement is explained in greater 
detail below.  Freeman neither appeals the March 4, 2013 order nor argues that the 
District Court erred in dismissing as non-exhausted the allegations against Miller. 
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Freeman by not taking it seriously.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Young, 960 F.2d at 363 
n.23.    
 Freeman’s second claim was, in essence, that Captain McCoy and Officers Hoot 
and Henz unconstitutionally failed to protect him by talking Williams into surrender 
rather than forcefully removing him from Freeman.  Although the District Court entered 
summary judgment against this claim, it previously held in its March 4, 2013 order that 
Freeman had failed to administratively exhaust it.  We may affirm on any grounds 
supported by the record.  United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust claims 
based on prison conditions by raising them in any available administrative grievance 
process before seeking redress in federal court.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  The exhaustion requirement applies on a claim-by-claim 
basis.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 223 (2007).  On his grievance form, Freeman 
complained only of prison guards’ failure to prevent Williams’ attack by adequately 
responding to his stabbing threat; he made no allegations concerning any improper 
response or delay in coming to his rescue.  Freeman failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies for this claim, mandating its dismissal.  See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 




 Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement  
 In February 2010, after admittedly displaying a noose made with bed sheets and 
threatening suicide, Freeman was placed in a “hard” cell used for suicidal inmates.  He 
was denied a desk, seat, showers, a mattress, soap, recreation, mail, and toilet paper, and 
was permitted to wear only underwear and a suicide smock for approximately seven days.  
Due to his prolonged exposure to the allegedly low cell temperature, Freeman claimed 
that he contracted a cold, suffered a massive headache, and his feet went numb, started 
burning, and suffered permanent nerve damage.  He alleged that prison staff mostly 
ignored his pleas for relief from the cold, failing to give him a “blueberry” blanket as the 
psychiatrist authorized and delaying two days in responding to his requests for medical 
attention, which then proved largely ineffective in treating his pain.    
 Placing an inmate in restricted housing does not violate the Eighth Amendment 
“as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without 
penological justification.”  See Young, 960 F.2d at 364.  Conditions of confinement are 
unconstitutional where a prisoner is denied the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities” through prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a condition posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).  Only “extreme deprivations” meet this standard.  Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).  In particular, while a prisoner is entitled to adequate 
medical care, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, if a prisoner is receiving physician attention, 
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“a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is 
in capable hands.”  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Even crediting his factual allegations, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude 
that Freeman suffered an Eighth Amendment deprivation.  See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 
322.  Placing Freeman in the hard cell and removing items he could use to either harm 
himself or block guards from observing his condition was a reasonable response to his 
suicide threat and the need to deter such behavior.  See Young, 960 F.2d at 364.  His stay 
in the hard cell did not violate the Eighth Amendment so long as the conditions of his 
confinement during that period were also constitutional.  See id.  Freeman has not shown 
otherwise. 
 The alleged delay in medical care did not amount to an unconstitutional 
deprivation.  Freeman admittedly was treated by Dr. Weisner two days into his stay in the 
hard cell.  Dr. Weisner provided him Tylenol and, later, Elavil—which Freeman reported 
to be helpful—for his cold, headache, and foot pain.  Any delay did not result in serious 
harm in light of (1) Dr. Weisner’s conclusion that the foot pain was attributable to pre-
existing, non-specific neuropathy, not caused by the temporary conditions in the hard 
cell,4 and (2) no evidence that the cold and headache persisted or worsened.  See Farmer, 
                                              
4 Outside of (1) an article on trench foot, which no evidence suggests a doctor diagnosed 
him with, and (2) a physician’s letter stating that Freeman has peripheral neuropathy, 
similarly unhelpful because the physician does not indicate that his hard-cell stay caused 
the neuropathy, Freeman produced no evidence to contest Dr. Weisner’s opinion that 
Freeman suffered from pre-existing neuropathy.  Additionally, the evidence does not 
indicate, as Freeman argues, that Dr. Weisner’s diagnosis concerned only his right foot.  
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511 U.S. at 834.  Because Freeman received Dr. Weisner’s attention, the non-medical 
correctional officers cannot have been deliberately indifferent to a serious risk related to 
lack of proper medical care.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. 
 Regarding Freeman’s mail, the record reflects that it was only temporarily 
withheld.  This temporary restriction was reasonably related to the prison’s penological 
interest in limiting the items available to him while he was potentially at risk of suicide, 
see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989), and Freeman did not indicate that 
the mail interruption injured his litigation efforts, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 
(1996).  Indeed, he points to no evidence that denial of any amenities, even if unpleasant, 
caused him harm.  See, e.g., Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam) (recognizing possible unconstitutional prison condition where officials denied 
toothpaste allegedly resulting in gum damage and tooth decay); Knight v. Armontrout, 
878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that 13-day deprivation of recreation was 
not unconstitutional); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1234–35 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(holding five-day denial of toilet paper and 10-day deprivation of soap insufficient to 
state Eighth Amendment claim where prisoner suffered no physical harm).   
 Freeman’s alleged lack of adequate clothing combined with cold exposure is the 
only deprivation potentially rising to a constitutional violation.  See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 
U.S. 294, 304 (1991).  Freeman and Appellees point to conflicting evidence regarding the 
temperature of his cell and the amount of clothing he received.  Assuming conditions 
were as harsh as Freeman described, the evidence nevertheless does not show that 
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Appellees demonstrated the requisite mental culpability by failing to respond to his 
complaints.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  While Freeman claimed that he repeatedly told 
Appellees about the cold and its effect on his feet and health, it is undisputed that he 
received medical attention and that there were no complaints of heating malfunction in 
the other cells and common areas in his housing unit served by a single HVAC system.  
There is thus insufficient evidence to support a finding that nonmedical staff in that unit 
knew of and disregarded a substantial risk that Freeman would be seriously harmed by 
cold exposure.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
 As for the medical personnel implicated in Freeman’s claim, his medical records 
suggested that neuropathy made his feet more intolerant of cold temperatures.  The 
Eighth Amendment, however, does not guarantee comfortable incarceration, see Rhodes, 
452 U.S. at 349, and, as we have explained, Freeman marshaled insufficient evidence 
showing that significant harm was likely or occurred.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  
Moreover, regardless of his individual sensitivity, a reasonable factfinder could not 
conclude, based on the circumstances as Freeman described them, that he was exposed to 
cold conditions of sufficient severity and duration to objectively amount to an “extreme 
deprivation.”  See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see, e.g., Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 353 
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 17-hour outdoor confinement without any protective 
clothing or shelter from extreme wind and cold might be an unconstitutional deprivation); 
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642–44 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding summary judgment to 
be inappropriate where undisputed evidence showed that prisoner was kept for multiple 
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winters in 40-degree, ice-coated cell).  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
entering summary judgment against this claim.  See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
